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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 A jury convicted appellants Christopher G. Wright, 
Ravinder (“Ravi”) S. Chawla, and Andrew Teitelman 
(“Appellants”) of honest services fraud in violation of, inter 
alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, mail fraud (referred to below as 
“traditional” fraud) in violation of, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341, and conspiracy to commit these offenses in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  After sentencing, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), 
affected the law of honest services fraud.  Among other 
arguments on appeal, Appellants challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence and assert that Skilling undermines their 
convictions.  We agree that Skilling requires a new trial on 
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Appellants’ honest services fraud convictions and that 
prejudicial spillover tainted their traditional fraud convictions.  
We thus vacate and remand. 
I. Background 
 From 2005 through 2007, Wright was Chief of Staff to 
Philadelphia City Councilman John “Jack” Kelly.1
 More specifically, Wright received three main 
benefits.  First, he lived at least part-time in an apartment 
(with a free parking space) for 14 months without paying rent.  
World Acquisition had contracted to buy a building at 2000 
Delancey Street in Philadelphia, then sold its right to buy the 
  Wright 
was also a realtor.  Chawla owned the real estate firm World 
Acquisition Partners (“World Acquisition”), and Teitelman, 
an attorney, did most of the firm’s legal work.  Teitelman was 
not a World Acquisition employee, but his offices were in its 
office suite, and most of his work came from World 
Acquisition.  Chawla and Teitelman befriended Wright when 
Wright had an office in the same building. 
 This case concerns a series of gifts that Chawla, 
Teitelman, or both gave Wright and a simultaneous series of 
official acts that Wright took on behalf of World Acquisition.  
Wright received a free stint in an apartment, free legal 
services, and was promised commissions on World 
Acquisition deals.  At the same time, Wright shepherded a 
bill that Chawla favored through Kelly’s office, arranged 
meetings about a World Acquisition development, and 
communicated with City of Philadelphia offices for World 
Acquisition. 
                                              
1 Councilman Kelly was not implicated in any of the crimes 
charged against Appellants. 
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building to another purchaser.  Meanwhile, Wright was in 
divorce proceedings and struggled with alcohol abuse.  
Teitelman, concerned for Wright, helped him move into one 
of the building’s vacant units.  The parties contest the extent 
to which Chawla knew about this arrangement.  The new 
purchaser’s agent soon discovered Wright, who left the 
apartment months later after the new purchaser sought to 
evict him. 
 Second, Wright received free legal help from 
Teitelman and his associate.  When the Delancey Street 
building’s new owner attempted to evict Wright, Teitelman 
defended him.  Teitelman also took over negotiations with the 
lawyer for Wright’s wife when Wright could no longer afford 
his previous divorce lawyer.  Finally, Teitelman defended 
Wright in a bank foreclosure against Wright’s marital home.  
For all that work, Teitelman billed Wright but $350, and did 
so only after Teitelman learned that the FBI was investigating 
their relationship.  As with the apartment, the parties contest 
Chawla’s involvement. 
 Third, Wright was promised commissions in his 
capacity as a realtor.  He occasionally “brought deals” to 
World Acquisition in the same manner that any realtor could, 
but none of those deals succeeded, so Wright never earned 
anything.  On one occasion, World Acquisition granted 
Wright and his partner the exclusive right to approach a buyer 
for a $100 million property.  Had Wright succeeded in 
making the sale, he would have earned a commission of $6 
million, but that deal also fell through.  Chawla offered 
Wright “liaison work” as well,2
                                              
2 In an email about the River City project, discussed below, 
Wright concluded to Chawla that “I am there if you need 
 but Wright declined that 
offer. 
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 While he was receiving those benefits, Wright took 
three sets of actions as Councilman Kelly’s Chief of Staff that 
tended to benefit World Acquisition.  First, Wright helped 
Kelly propose and pass a “mechanical parking” ordinance.  
Philadelphia law required developers planning to install 
mechanical parking to get a zoning variance, a time-
consuming process.  At Teitelman’s behest, Wright set up a 
meeting at which Chawla and his partner suggested that Kelly 
change that law.  Kelly, who usually took a pro-development 
stance, agreed.  Chawla and Teitelman prodded Wright to 
make the bill a priority, and Kelly soon after introduced the 
bill.  The City Council passed it by a vote of 15-0. 
 Second, Wright helped Chawla oppose an ordinance 
that would cripple a planned World Acquisition project.  
Chawla envisioned a large development called “River City” 
south and west of Philadelphia’s Logan Square, where low-
rise residences predominate.  When the neighborhood 
association protested, Wright arranged a meeting between 
Chawla and association leaders.  Afterward, Wright wrote 
Chawla and Teitelman advising that his “role as Jack’s Chief 
of Staff” should be to focus City staff on River City’s 
benefits.  Nonetheless, in the face of continued opposition, 
the City Council passed a building-height restriction that 
thwarted the River City plans.  Kelly joined the 15-0 vote. 
 Third, Wright worked with other City offices on World 
Acquisition’s behalf.  When the Parking Authority was 
                                                                                                     
me.”  In his brief reply twelve minutes later, Chawla wrote: 
“Thanks for your offer. . . .  We will need your help on going 
forward with this project and would like to retain you as our 
consultant to handle liaison work.  We will discuss when we 
meet next.”  
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selling a certain property, Wright forwarded public 
information about its “request for proposal” process to 
Chawla and Teitelman.  Wright also arranged a walkthrough 
of the property.  He obtained public information for World 
Acquisition from Philadelphia Gas Works through a high-
level official rather than through the main call center.  
Finally, Wright worked with the City’s Department of 
Licenses and Inspections on a certification that the River City 
property was not encumbered with zoning violations.  City 
Council staff often did so for their constituents, though this 
certification was unusually complicated.  
 In 2008, a federal grand jury returned a fourteen-count 
indictment against Chawla, Teitelman, Wright, and Chawla’s 
brother Hardeep.  The indictment charged honest services 
fraud, traditional fraud, conspiracy to commit both kinds of 
fraud, and bribery in connection with a federally funded 
program.  After a four-week jury trial, including five days of 
deliberations, the jury convicted Chawla, Teitelman, and 
Wright on three counts: (1) conspiracy to commit honest 
services and traditional fraud (Count One); (2) honest 
services fraud for the apartment arrangement (Count Ten); 
and (3) traditional fraud for the apartment arrangement 
(Count Twelve).  The jury further convicted Chawla alone on 
one honest services count for offering Wright liaison work 
(Count Three).  It acquitted on the other ten counts and 
acquitted Hardeep Chawla of all counts. 
 The District Court sentenced Wright to 48 months’ 
imprisonment, Chawla to 30 months, and Teitelman to 24 
months, followed in each case by two years of supervised 
release.  It also imposed fines and special assessments on 
each person.  After sentencing, they filed timely appeals to 
our Court.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
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 Appellants challenge their convictions on the grounds 
that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict them on any 
count; (2) the jury instructions on honest services fraud 
constitute error after the Supreme Court’s intervening 
decision in Skilling; (3) if the honest services fraud 
convictions are vacated for any reason, the traditional fraud 
convictions must be as well due to “prejudicial spillover;” (4) 
the Government constructively amended the indictment; (5) 
the District Court allowed inadmissible evidence; and (6) it 
improperly calculated Appellants’ Guidelines sentencing 
ranges. 
 We stayed the briefing schedule pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Skilling.  After that decision, all 
defendants were released on bail without the Government’s 
objection. 
II. Discussion 
 A. Honest Services Fraud: Sufficiency of the 
Evidence 
 “Honest services fraud” has proven hard to define.  We 
recently reviewed its history at length, see United States v. 
Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2010), so a shorter 
treatment is sufficient here.  The District Court instructed the 
jury that it could convict for honest services fraud under 
either a “conflict of interest” theory (whereby it is fraud for a 
public servant not to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in 
personal gain) or a “bribery” theory (whereby it is fraud for a 
public servant to accept benefits in exchange for taking an 
official action).  At the time, this instruction properly stated 
our law.  See United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 
(3d Cir. 2002).  However, the Supreme Court later construed 
“honest services fraud” to exclude the conflict-of-interest 
theory, holding that this interpretation of the statute would 
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render it unconstitutionally vague.  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 
2927-35.  The jury’s general verdict, encompassing both 
theories, could thus be defective. 
 Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict them on the bribery theory alone, requiring that we 
vacate their convictions.  This contention echoes their motion 
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29, which the District Court denied. 
 “The burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.”  United 
States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 770 (3d Cir. 2000)).  
We must affirm the jury’s verdict so long as “there is 
substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of 
fact to convict.”  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 We thus turn to the definition of honest services fraud.  
The bribery theory, which is the only theory left standing to 
convict for honest services fraud in our case,3
                                              
3 In addition to bribery, Skilling held that honest services 
fraud may encompass kickbacks.  130 S. Ct. at 2932 
(“Reading [28 U.S.C.] § 1346 to proscribe bribes and 
kickbacks—and nothing more—satisfies Congress’ 
undoubted aim . . . .”).  Kickbacks are not at issue here. 
 
 “requires a quid 
pro quo,” United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281 (3d Cir. 
2007), that is, “a specific intent to give or receive something 
of value in exchange for an official act.”  United States v. 
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) 
(emphasis in original).  (The Supreme Court has contrasted 
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bribery with a gratuity, which is “merely a reward for some 
future act that the public official will take[,] and may already 
have determined to take[,] or for a past act that he has already 
taken.”  Id. at 405.)  The bribery theory does not require that 
each quid, or item of value, be linked to a specific quo, or 
official act.  Rather, a bribe may come in the form of a 
“stream of benefits.”  United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 
240-41 (3d Cir. 2011).  The public official need not even 
perform the official acts if he stood ready to do so having 
intended to accept a bribe.  Id.  Intent is the determinant.  
“The key to whether a gift constitutes a bribe is whether the 
parties intended for the benefit to be made in exchange for 
some official action; [indeed,] the government need not prove 
that each gift was provided with the intent to prompt a 
specific official act.”  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 282. 
 An honest services fraud prosecution for bribery after 
Skilling thus requires the factfinder to determine two things.  
First, it must conclude that the payor provided a benefit to a 
public official intending that he will thereby take favorable 
official acts that he would not otherwise take.  Second, it must 
conclude that the official accepted those benefits with the 
intent to take official acts to benefit the payor.  See Bryant, 
655 F.3d at 240-41; Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281-82.  The intent of 
both parties may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.  
“The quid pro quo can be implicit, that is, a conviction can 
occur if the Government shows that [the official] accepted 
payments or other consideration with the implied 
understanding that he would perform or not perform an act in 
his official capacity ‘under color of official right.’”  United 
States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 As noted, the jury convicted all three Appellants on 
Count One, conspiracy to commit honest services fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  “The specific elements of 
conspiracy to violate federal law are: . . . an agreement to 
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commit an offense proscribed by federal law; . . . the 
defendants intentionally joining in the agreement; [and] one 
of the conspirators committing an overt act . . . in furtherance 
of the conspiracy.”  United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 206 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  In the honest services fraud 
context, the Government must prove overt acts in furtherance 
of a quid pro quo, such as mutual and contemporaneous 
benefits. 
 There were mutual and contemporaneous benefits in 
this case.  Teitelman provided Wright a free place to live and 
free legal services.  As we discuss below, Chawla likely knew 
of their arrangement and could have encouraged it.  That 
arrangement supported the convictions of all three Appellants 
on Count Ten, a specific instance of alleged honest services 
fraud.  Chawla also was undeniably involved in extending 
Wright his exclusive potential commission, and Teitelman 
sent the email expressly granting that opportunity.  In 
addition, Chawla sent Wright the email offering him “liaison 
work,” which was the basis for his conviction on Count 
Three.  At the same time, Wright helped Chawla bring 
mechanical parking to Kelly’s attention.  Thereafter, Wright 
made sure that Councilman Kelly’s office quickly prepared a 
bill and had Kelly introduce it.  Wright also set up meetings 
for Chawla to persuade the Logan Square Neighborhood 
Association to support River City.  He did so even though his 
boss, Kelly, planned to vote for the anti-River City height 
restriction because Logan Square’s councilman supported it.  
Finally, Wright used his influence and knowledge to work 
with City agencies on World Acquisition’s behalf more 
effectively than Chawla or Teitelman could. 
 Intent, which the Government must prove both for 
conspiracy in Count One and for the specific frauds in Counts 
Three and Ten, is the more difficult question.  Parties to a 
bribery scheme rarely reduce their intent to words, but the law 
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does not require that.  “The official and the payor need not 
state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the 
law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.  
The inducement from the official is criminal . . . if it is 
implied from his words and actions . . . .”  Evans v. United 
States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and in the judgment).  Furthermore, Count One is a 
conspiracy charge, and “the very nature of the crime of 
conspiracy is such that it often may be established only by 
indirect and circumstantial evidence.”  United States v. 
Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005).  Inferring mental 
state from circumstantial evidence is among the chief tasks of 
factfinders.  We rely on the good sense of jurors (and, where 
applicable, trial judges) to distinguish intent from knowledge 
or recklessness where the direct evidence is necessarily 
scanty.  
 In this case, a reasonable jury could find that each 
Appellant had fraudulent intent.  Therefore, Appellants have 
failed to show that the evidence against them was insufficient, 
as a jury could find that the Government had proven each of 
the elements of honest services fraud and conspiracy to 
commit it.  We consider the inferences that a jury could have 
made about each Appellant in turn. 
 First, consider Wright.  The language of some of his 
emails could persuade a jury that he intended to be 
influenced.  For example, the request-for-proposal 
information about the Parking Authority property that Wright 
provided to Chawla and Teitelman was publicly available.  
But in advising Chawla of a certain deadline, Wright added 
that “[t]he party must sign in and this will be [a] public record 
- it would not be [a] good thing for me to sign for this RFP - 
so you should do it or someone from [World Acquisition] 
should do [it.]”  Regarding River City, Wright emailed 
Chawla (copying Teitelman) without prompting to offer his 
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help.  “[Y]ou need someone to contact and monitor City 
Planning efforts,” Wright wrote.  “My role as Jack’s Chief of 
Staff should be to keep City Planning’s focus on what [R]iver 
[C]ity will . . . bring to . . . Philadelphia’s tax base/economy 
for the next twenty years.” 
 This is the language of collaboration and influence.  In 
the spring of 2007, the date of both emails, Wright was living 
in the Delancey Street apartment and receiving Teitelman’s 
legal help.  Mere simultaneity does not create an exchange, 
but, coupled with the emails, a jury could infer intent.  In 
addition, the Government presented other evidence that could 
indicate Wright’s intent.  In one heated exchange with Kelly 
in the summer of 2006, Kelly told Wright that he should be 
paying rent for the apartment and that Wright’s relationship 
with World Acquisition should be “squeaky clean.”  Though 
he knew it was an issue, Wright lived in the apartment for a 
year thereafter without paying rent. 
 Second, a jury could infer that Chawla knew of and 
approved the benefits that Wright received.  The contract 
under which Chawla sold his rights to buy 2000 Delancey 
Street, the site of Wright’s free apartment, forbade Chawla 
from putting new tenants there.  Wright’s presence before 
closing would risk the deal’s collapse.  Yet, sometime around 
the closing, a friend had told Chawla that Wright was “happy 
and comfortable” in the apartment.  Chawla, rather than being 
surprised or upset, “was happy about that.”  Chawla also 
conceded to Kelly in mid-2007 that “Andy [Teitelman] gives 
[Wright] free legal advice.”  Teitelman was Chawla’s lawyer 
working in Chawla’s office.  As Teitelman was representing 
Wright in a divorce, a foreclosure, and an eviction, it is 
plausible that Chawla approved of it.  A reasonable jury could 
combine that knowledge with Chawla’s emails to infer 
fraudulent intent.  Chawla told Teitelman to “chase Chris” on 
the mechanical parking issue, which Teitelman promptly did.  
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And when he learned unfavorable news about River City, 
Chawla wrote Wright, requesting simply: “Chris: Please call 
Andy or me asap.  Thanks.”  Shortly thereafter, Wright 
arranged for Chawla to meet with the Logan Square 
Neighborhood Association.  Finally, in the email on which his 
Count Three conviction was based, Chawla proposed that 
Wright handle “liaison work” for World Acquisition, though 
he declined. 
 Third, it is plausible that Teitelman intended to help 
influence Wright.  There is no dispute that Teitelman got 
Wright fourteen free months in an apartment with a parking 
space in an affluent neighborhood.  When the agent of the 
Delancey Street building’s new owner found Wright there, 
everyone passed the buck to Teitelman, who promised to 
have Wright moved out when the owner requested.  Instead, 
Teitelman defended Wright in the eviction attempt, drafting 
the answer to the eviction complaint referred to in Count Ten.  
And there is no dispute that Teitelman acted as Wright’s 
personal lawyer in other matters when Wright could no longer 
afford one.  Teitelman himself sent many of the emails 
soliciting official acts from Wright, and he (Teitelman) was 
copied as a recipient on most others.  A jury could infer that 
Teitelman conferred these benefits on Wright so that he 
would help the business of Teitelman’s main client, Chawla. 
 Thus, drawing all possible inferences in the 
Government’s favor, a reasonable jury could have found that 
Chawla and Teitelman conferred benefits on Wright intending 
to secure his favors, and that Wright accepted those benefits 
intending to aid Chawla and Teitelman.  The evidence was 
therefore sufficient to convict Appellants of honest services 
fraud, and conspiracy to commit that fraud, under the bribery 
theory alone. 
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 B. Honest Services Fraud: Erroneous Jury 
Instruction 
 Appellants also challenge their honest services fraud 
convictions in Counts One, Three, and Ten on the ground that 
Skilling rendered the District Court’s jury instructions 
erroneous.  Both sides agree that the “jury [was] instructed on 
multiple theories of guilt, one of which is improper.”  
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) (per curiam).  In 
light of Skilling, the jury should have been instructed on the 
bribery theory but not the conflict-of-interest theory. 
 “This determination, however, does not necessarily 
require reversal of the [honest services fraud] conviction[s]; 
. . . errors of [this] variety are subject to harmless-error 
analysis.”  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934.  We presume that such 
errors are not harmless “unless it can be ‘prove[d] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”  United States v. Waller, 
654 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  That Appellants 
objected to the District Court’s honest services fraud 
instruction on other grounds suffices to preserve this issue for 
our review.  See Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2970 
(2010) (“[B]y properly objecting to the honest-services jury 
instructions at trial, Defendants secured their right to 
challenge those instructions on appeal.”). 
 We do not believe that the Government has proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury instruction on the 
conflict-of-interest theory did not affect the honest services 
verdict.  That theory required nondisclosure of a financial 
interest that could conflict with a public official’s duty to 
provide honest services.  See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 690.  
There is ample evidence on which the jury could have 
convicted Appellants under that theory.  By contrast, the 
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evidence supporting the bribery theory, while sufficient, is 
less than the “overwhelming” evidence needed to hold that an 
error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States 
v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 In particular, the jury may have drawn inferences 
about Appellants’ intent that would not sustain a verdict 
based on the bribery theory.  In the sufficiency-of-evidence 
context, we must draw all reasonable inferences in the 
Government’s favor.  Without that constraint here, we believe 
that other inferences about Appellants’ intent are plausible.  
As above, we will address the intent of each Appellant in 
turn. 
 First, Wright may have intended not to be influenced, 
but merely to do his job.  By reputation and by his own trial 
testimony, Councilman Kelly favored developers and 
business interests.  He also testified that constituent services 
advancing his policy goals were part of Wright’s job.  Wright 
therefore could not “pick and choose” which developers he 
would assist.  Kelly no less than Chawla encouraged Wright 
to make mechanical parking a priority in his office.  On cross-
examination, Kelly approved of Wright’s other “official acts” 
as within the scope of his job.  Kelly’s legislative assistant 
also testified that while Chawla and his brother “called a lot,” 
they were among many constituents who did so.  The 
President of the Northeast Philadelphia Chamber of 
Commerce, for example, testified that Wright went personally 
to visit with its members and worked with many City 
departments on their behalf.  When Chawla’s requests 
extended beyond “constituent services,” as in his offer of 
liaison work, Wright declined.  On this evidence, the jury 
could have acquitted Wright of honest services fraud under 
the bribery theory because he lacked the required intent to be 
influenced.  
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 Second, it is not clear beyond doubt that the jury found 
Chawla seeking to bribe Wright.  The Government presented 
little evidence that Chawla directed Teitelman’s gifts or even 
that he was closely involved with them.  There was no direct 
evidence that Chawla knew that Wright stayed in the 
apartment for free until well after Wright had performed the 
official acts at issue.  This is a critical distinction because, 
were Wright paying, his tenancy could not constitute a gift.  
The jury thus could have inferred that Chawla knew only that 
Teitelman had found Wright a place to live.  And while 
Chawla knew of Teitelman’s free legal services for Wright, 
there is no evidence that he asked Teitelman to perform them.  
Chawla openly admitted knowledge of these legal services 
when Kelly was asking him about his ties to Wright in a 
conversation that the FBI instigated and recorded.  Moreover, 
Chawla’s brief emails do not necessarily show sinister intent.  
High-level executives are known for quick missives tapped 
out on mobile devices between meetings.  The jury thus might 
have concluded that while Chawla knew the possible 
ramifications of Teitelman’s gifts to Wright, he did not intend 
thereby to influence Wright. 
 Third, Teitelman’s friendship with Wright offers a 
motive for his generosity other than fraud.  The evidence 
establishes, and the Government does not dispute, that Wright 
and Teitelman were close friends.  It is equally clear that 
Wright was in dire personal straits at the time.  His mother 
had just died of cancer, he was embroiled in a marital fight 
and divorce, he was essentially broke, and he was drinking 
heavily.  Teitelman was among Wright’s few friends who 
intervened and helped him enter rehabilitation.  Those same 
friends agreed that Wright should walk to work in Center City 
Philadelphia rather than drive to and from his brother’s home.  
While friendship is no bar to an honest services fraud 
conviction (as the parties involved are often friends), these 
facts show a close friendship.  Here, the jury could have 
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found that friendship, not fraud, motivated Teitelman to find 
the apartment in Center City and to act as Wright’s lawyer. 
 In addition to these alternate inferences about 
Appellants’ intent, the context of the trial suggests that the 
jury may have convicted based on the erroneous conflict-of-
interest instruction.  See Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 
321, 338 (3d Cir. 2010) (“While many . . . cases focus on the 
quantum of evidence against the defendants, harmless-error 
analysis must, by necessity, take into account the totality of 
the circumstances.”  (citation omitted)).  For example, the 
Government insisted in its opening argument that public 
disclosure forms exist to ensure that “public service is not 
being tainted.”  It also linked the Pennsylvania ethics laws to 
bribery in its closing arguments.  And the jury instructions 
themselves devoted about eight times more words to the 
conflict-of-interest theory than they did to the bribery theory. 
 Considering these plausible alternate inferences about 
Appellants’ intent and a trial environment that emphasized 
the conflict-of-interest theory, we cannot say that the 
erroneous instruction did not contribute to the verdict.  We 
therefore vacate Appellants’ honest services fraud convictions 
and remand for a new trial. 
 C. Traditional Mail Fraud: Sufficiency of the 
Evidence 
 Appellants’ other convictions were for traditional mail 
fraud.  In addition to charging a conspiracy to commit honest 
services fraud, Count One charged that Appellants conspired, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to commit traditional fraud.  
Count Twelve, the only specific instance of traditional fraud 
in the indictment, charged that Appellants committed mail 
fraud in violation of, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  The jury 
convicted on both counts.  Appellants challenge these 
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convictions, as they challenged their honest services fraud 
convictions, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. 
 Our standard of review in the sufficiency-of-evidence 
context, while technically plenary, is stringent.  To repeat, we 
must affirm the jury’s verdict so long as “there is substantial 
evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.”  
Lee, 612 F.3d at 178 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
This challenge thus “‘places a very heavy burden on [the] 
appellant[s].’”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 
(citation omitted). 
 We read § 1341 to contain three elements: “(1) a 
scheme to defraud; (2) use of the mails to further that scheme; 
and (3) fraudulent intent.”  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 
62, 81 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We have elaborated that “‘fraudulent representations, as the 
term is used in [section] 1341, may be effected by deceitful 
statements or half-truths or the concealment of material facts 
and the devising of a scheme for obtaining money or property 
by such statements or concealments.’”  United States v. 
Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3d Cir. 1989) (modification in 
original) (quoting United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 410 
(10th Cir. 1977)). 
 Traditional mail fraud under § 1341 involves 
defrauding a private party of money or property, whereas 
honest services fraud under § 1346 involves defrauding the 
public of an official’s “honest services.”  (Unlike honest 
services fraud, Skilling did not disturb the law of traditional 
fraud.)  Both Count Ten and Count Twelve were based on the 
same facts: Wright’s occupancy of the Delancey Street 
apartment and the answer that Teitelman mailed in Wright’s 
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eviction case.4
 Appellants contend that, far from concealing Wright’s 
presence, as Olatunji requires, they were forthright about it.  
  But whereas Count Ten charged that the 
scheme defrauded Philadelphia’s citizens of Wright’s honest 
services, Count Twelve charged that the scheme defrauded 
the building’s owner, PBRG, of rent payments. 
 We believe that, under the demanding standard of 
review applied here, we cannot say the evidence was 
insufficient to convict Appellants of traditional fraud.  We 
consider each of the three elements of traditional mail fraud 
in turn. 
 The first element is that there was a fraudulent scheme.  
A reasonable jury could have found that Appellants sought to 
defraud PBRG of Wright’s rent.  PBRG bought the building 
to renovate it and convert it to condominiums.  For that 
reason, PBRG’s principal, Robert Guttman, testified that he 
“certainly wanted to know” how many units of the mostly 
vacant building were occupied.  Yet at the closing no one 
mentioned that Wright had just moved in.  That was not for 
want of opportunity.  Guttman had bought his right to 
purchase the building from Chawla, and Teitelman formed 
PBRG as an entity for the purpose of Guttman and his brother 
buying buildings from World Acquisition.  Moreover, at 
closing Guttman was provided with a document that listed 
Wright’s apartment as empty.  The Government presented no 
evidence that Chawla or Teitelman prepared that document.  
But it would be possible for a jury to infer that, because 
Chawla had sold PBRG its right to purchase the building, he 
had to approve the list. 
                                              
4 These facts also formed part of the basis for the conspiracy 
charged in Count One. 
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When PBRG’s realtor found Wright while inspecting the 
building, Wright did not make up a story about his presence 
there or say that he was paying rent.  The Government also 
does not contest that Wright complained to PBRG’s initial 
building manager about his apartment’s plumbing.  
Ultimately, Appellants argue, any scheme to conceal Wright 
from PBRG failed, as PBRG served him with an eviction 
notice early in 2007. 
 A reasonable jury need not have found these 
arguments persuasive.  Chawla knew that it was important to 
PBRG that the building be as vacant as possible.  A jury 
could have concluded that Wright’s absence on the closing 
documents constituted concealment of his presence there.  It 
could also conclude that Wright’s outreach to building 
managers was consistent with a scheme to defraud, as those 
managers may have assumed that PBRG had approved what 
Wright was doing. 
 The second element of traditional mail fraud is that the 
mailing alleged for mail fraud purposes—the answer that 
Teitelman’s associate filed in Wright’s eviction case—
furthered the alleged fraudulent scheme.  Appellants point out 
that “a mailing cannot . . . be considered even incident to an 
essential part of the scheme[] when it occurs after the scheme 
has reached fruition.”  United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 
187 (3d Cir. 2008).  Any scheme to defraud PBRG by 
concealing Wright’s occupancy, Appellants argue, must have 
ended by the time that Teitelman’s associate mailed a public 
legal document admitting that Wright was there.  Therefore, 
they contend, the sole alleged mailing could not have 
furthered the scheme. 
 A reasonable jury could have viewed the nature of the 
scheme differently, so that it did not end as soon as PBRG 
became aware of Wright’s presence.  The indictment alleges 
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that the nature of the scheme was “[t]o continue allowing 
[Wright] the free use of the Delancey Street Apartment and 
parking space . . . .”  The affirmative misstatement alleged 
toward that end was the claim, made in the mailed answer, 
that Wright had PBRG’s permission to live in the building.  
Viewing the scheme in this way, a jury could conclude that 
the mailed answer furthered the scheme. 
 The third element is that the defendant(s) knew about 
the alleged scheme and, therefore, could have had the 
requisite intent to defraud.  Chawla and Wright each claim 
that, to the extent that any such scheme existed, he did not 
know about it.  Chawla asserts that there was no evidence that 
he knew of Wright’s eviction, though he knew that Wright 
was in the apartment and that Teitelman was helping him 
with legal issues.  Wright similarly points to the lack of 
evidence that he knew about his exclusion from the closing 
documents or about any false statements made on his behalf 
during his eviction proceedings. 
 The Government responds with two arguments that a 
reasonable jury could have found persuasive.  First, the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to make the necessary 
inferences.  Wright, as Teitelman’s client, could have known 
what documents were being filed on his behalf.  Indeed, 
Wright asked Teitelman to handle the eviction complaint.  
And Chawla told Kelly in 2007 that he knew that Wright was 
living in the building and that Wright was tight on money.  
Second, even if Chawla and Wright did not personally know 
of or intend a fraud, co-conspirators act as mutual agents for 
one another.  See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 
1084, 1147 (3d Cir. 1990).  As such, each becomes 
responsible for the acts of the other.  On these grounds, a jury 
could have inferred not only that Wright and Chawla knew 
about the scheme to defraud but also that they intended it. 
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 Teitelman raises a fourth issue in his brief.  He asserts 
that if Appellants did conceal any information from PBRG, 
that information was not material, as the law requires.  See 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (“[A] false 
statement is material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, 
or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’” (quoting 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995))).  
Teitelman argues that Wright’s presence was not material 
because it did not impair PBRG’s ability to convert the 
building into condominiums.  However, Guttman testified 
that the presence of any renters or squatters in the building 
would have been material to him as, in effect, its purchaser.  
A reasonable jury could have determined, then, that 
information about Wright’s presence might have changed 
Guttman’s mind about the building’s value. 
 Based on the evidence recounted above, a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Appellants agreed on a scheme to 
defraud PBRG of payment for Wright’s tenancy by 
concealing his presence, that the answer mailed in Wright’s 
eviction case furthered that scheme, and that all three 
Appellants knew of the scheme and intended that it succeed.  
Therefore, a reasonable jury could have convicted Appellants 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and our interpretations thereof. 
 D. Traditional Mail Fraud: Prejudicial Spillover 
 Appellants’ traditional fraud convictions may be 
tainted by “prejudicial spillover” from the honest services 
fraud convictions that we vacate and remand.  When two 
charges are closely linked and we vacate a conviction on one 
of them, we must ensure that the error on the vacated charge 
has not affected the remaining charge.  If there has been such 
prejudicial spillover, we must order a new trial on the 
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remaining charge as well.  United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 
102, 122 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 We apply a two-step test for prejudicial spillover.  
First, we ask “whether the jury heard evidence that would 
have been inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining 
valid count[s].”  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 317 
(3d Cir. 2002).  If all evidence on the discarded counts (here, 
the honest services fraud counts) would remain admissible at 
a trial on the remaining valid counts (here, the traditional 
fraud counts), then our inquiry ends.  We would remand for 
resentencing on the valid counts only. 
 If some evidence would be inadmissible, then we 
proceed to the second step.  There, we ask whether that 
evidence (the “spillover evidence”) was prejudicial.  Id.  We 
answer that question by weighing four factors: “whether (1) 
the charges are intertwined with each other; (2) the evidence 
for the remaining counts is sufficiently distinct to support the 
verdict on these counts; (3) the elimination of the invalid 
count significantly changed the strategy of the trial; and (4) 
the prosecution used language of the sort to arouse a jury.”  
Murphy, 323 F.3d at 118 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 
United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
We evaluate these factors in a light “‘somewhat favorable to 
the defendant.’”  Murphy, 323 F.3d at 122 (quoting Pelullo, 
14 F.3d at 898).  If the otherwise inadmissible evidence was 
prejudicial, we remand for a new trial on the “tainted” count. 
 Applying this two-step test, we hold that there was 
spillover evidence from the honest services convictions to the 
traditional fraud convictions and that it was prejudicial.  As to 
the first step, much of the evidence at this trial would be 
inadmissible at a hypothetical trial on traditional mail fraud 
alone.  The bulk of the prosecution concerned Wright’s 
allegedly corrupt relationship with Chawla and Teitelman.  
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Proving that Appellants defrauded PBRG of rent would not 
require proving that Wright was a public servant, that Chawla 
and Teitelman sought to influence him, or that he sought to be 
influenced.  Evidence of the latter sort fills most of this case’s 
four-volume appendix. 
 Specifically, the following evidence likely would be 
inadmissible at a trial on traditional mail fraud alone: (1) 
Kelly’s testimony about Wright’s official duties as his Chief 
of Staff; (2) the testimony of City agency staff5
                                              
5 These agency staff included the head of Major Tax 
Enforcement, the Tax Enforcement Administrator, the 
Director of Corporate Communications at Philadelphia Gas 
Works, the Contract Administration Manager for the 
Philadelphia Parking Authority, and a clerk in the Licenses 
and Inspections Department. 
 
 about their 
interactions with Wright, which the Government alleges were 
undertaken to aid Chawla and Teitelman; (3) the testimony of 
Russell Meddin of the Logan Square Neighborhood 
Association about Wright’s work on the River City project; 
(4) the myriad emails among Appellants about the mechanical 
parking proposal and River City; (5) any evidence pertaining 
to a $1,000 check that Chawla’s brother Hardeep gave to 
Wright at a holiday party; and (6) the testimony by the 
Executive Director of the Pennsylvania State Ethics 
Commission and the General Counsel to the Philadelphia 
Board of Ethics regarding Wright’s disclosure obligations 
under state law (which pertained only to the conflict-of-
interest theory of honest services fraud).  This evidence is 
essentially irrelevant to the question of whether Appellants 
schemed to defraud PBRG of rent.  See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 
402. 
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 The Government counters that the enumerated 
evidence would be relevant to show Appellants’ motive to 
conceal Wright’s tenancy from PBRG.  As we explained in 
Cross, “[t]he existence of an overarching scheme can provide 
circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilt by explaining 
his motive in committing the alleged offense.”  308 F.3d at 
322-23.  However, were motive the sole purpose of this 
considerable body of evidence, a trial court likely would 
exclude some of it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or 
404.6
 For these reasons, acknowledging the generous 
discretion that these rules vest in district courts, much of the 
enumerated evidence would be inadmissible at a trial on 
Count Twelve alone.  Here, as in Murphy, “the quantum of 
  The probative value on the question of motive in 
several hundred pages of testimony and documentary 
evidence is outweighed by the costs of “needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”  Also, insofar as the evidence 
portrays Appellants as corrupt, any probative value on motive 
could be outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice.  And 
because the “motive” evidence tends to show one type of 
fraud (honest services) in a trial about another type 
(traditional), it may be inadmissible character evidence under 
Rule 404(b). 
                                              
6 Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
Rule 404(a)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character or trait.” 
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evidence . . . would not be necessary absent the [honest 
services fraud] theory.”  323 F.3d at 121. 
 We thus proceed to the second step of the prejudicial 
spillover inquiry.  Weighing the four Pelullo factors, we 
conclude that the otherwise inadmissible evidence was 
prejudicial. 
 First, the traditional fraud charge was intertwined with 
the honest services fraud charges.  The same facts underlay 
both Count Ten (honest services) and Count Twelve 
(traditional): Wright’s presence in the apartment and the 
answer that Teitelman’s associate filed in the eviction case.  
As in Pelullo, the charges “described similar, if not identical, 
methods used in the alleged frauds.”  14 F.3d at 898.  
Furthermore, because Count One charged both an honest 
services fraud conspiracy and a traditional fraud conspiracy, 
the jury instructions on that Count intermingled the two 
theories.  The Government points out that, because the jury 
did not convict on all counts, it must have understood the 
counts separately.  Cf. Lee, 612 F.3d at 181 (holding that 
charges were not intertwined, in part, because the jury 
convicted on one but acquitted on the other).  But in this case 
the jury convicted all three Appellants on the two counts most 
likely to be confused. 
 Second, there was scant evidence that would support a 
traditional fraud conviction yet be distinct from the honest 
services fraud charges.  The apartment was the most valuable 
of the alleged bribes that Wright accepted.  Yet without his 
stint there being rent-free—the crux of the traditional fraud 
charge—the jury could not characterize it as a bribe or as an 
impediment to Wright’s honest services.  Thus little of the 
traditional fraud evidence is independent of the honest 
services fraud evidence. 
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 Third, the parties’ strategy likely would have differed 
in a trial on traditional mail fraud alone.  We have addressed 
this factor in much the same way that we address the first part 
of the prejudicial spillover test.  Namely, we assess the extent 
to which the parties would have called different witnesses 
and, correspondingly, the extent to which their opening and 
closing arguments would have differed.  See Lee, 612 F.3d at 
182-83; Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 898-99.  In this case, the parties 
would not have needed to present evidence or opening and 
closing arguments about the allegedly corrupt relationships 
among Wright, Chawla, and Teitelman. 
 Fourth and finally, the prosecution’s language about 
honest services fraud was “of the sort to arouse a jury.”  In its 
opening argument, for example, the Government told the jury 
that “[t]he Chawla brothers bought big, big properties, but 
they didn’t buy them to . . . develop them, no, they . . . ma[de] 
a quick profit with no investment in time or rehabilitation.”  
As for Wright, “he was seduced by that money, the free 
apartment, the potential for future wealth,” seduction that 
eventually “had become a full-blown affair.”  The closing 
argument used similar rhetoric that likewise did not pertain to 
the traditional fraud charge.  The Government proclaimed that 
“Chris Wright was bought and paid for . . . to do their 
personal bidding, to be their personal public servant,” and that 
he “was no longer looking after the good of the City of 
Philadelphia.”  This language speaks for itself.  It is 
provocative, and it went well beyond Appellants’ motive for 
allegedly defrauding PBRG. 
 Having concluded that both parts of the inquiry are 
satisfied, we hold that there was prejudicial spillover in this 
case.  We therefore vacate Appellants’ traditional fraud 
convictions as well as their honest services fraud convictions, 
and remand for a new trial. 
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III. Conclusion 
 We believe that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
Appellants on each count.  However, the Skilling decision that 
followed trial made the District Court’s instructions on honest 
services fraud incorrect.  Because our law of honest services 
fraud leaves so much to intent and because intent leaves so 
much to the jury’s ability to make reasonable inferences, we 
cannot say that this error was harmless.  Further, as the 
evidence of honest services fraud overlapped substantially 
evidence submitted on traditional fraud, prejudicial spillover 
tainted Appellants’ traditional fraud convictions.  We thus 
vacate all four counts of conviction and remand for a new 
trial.7
                                              
7 In this context, we need not reach Appellants’ constructive 
amendment, evidentiary, and sentencing challenges. 
 
  
